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Abstract
Background: As the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak (EVD) transitions to its post-endemic phase, its impact on
the future of global public health, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), is the subject of continued
debate. Criticism of WHO’s performance grew louder in the outbreak’s wake, placing this international health UN-
specialized agency in the difficult position of navigating a complex series of reform recommendations put forth by
different stakeholders. Decisions on WHO governance reform and the broader role of the United Nations could
very well shape the future landscape of 21st century global health and how the international community
responds to health emergencies.
Discussion: In order to better understand the implications of the EVD outbreak on global health and infectious
disease governance, this debate article critically examines a series of reports issued by four high-level commissions/
panels convened to specifically assess WHO’s performance post-Ebola. Collectively, these recommendations add
increasing complexity to the urgent need for WHO reform, a process that the agency must carry out in order to
maintain its legitimacy. Proposals that garnered strong support included the formation of an independent WHO Centre
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, the urgent need to increase WHO infectious disease funding and capacity,
and establishing better operational and policy coordination between WHO, UN agencies, and other global health
partners. The recommendations also raise more fundamental questions about restructuring the global health
architecture, and whether the UN should play a more active role in global health governance.
Summary: Despite the need for a fully modernized WHO, reform proposals recently announced by WHO fail
to achieve the “evolution” in global health governance needed in order to ensure that global society is
adequately protected against the multifaceted and increasingly complex nature of modern public health
emergencies. Instead, the lasting legacy of the EVD outbreak may be its foreshadowing of a governance
“shift” in formal sharing of the complex responsibilities of global health, health security, outbreak response,
and managing health emergencies to other international structures, most notably the United Nations. Only
time will tell if the legacy of EVD will include a WHO that has the full support of the international community and is
capable of leading human society in this brave new era of the globalization of infectious diseases.
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Background
In January 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared that the devastating 2014 Ebola virus disease
(EVD) outbreak in West Africa was finally coming to an
end and in March officially announced it was no longer
a public health emergency [1]. These developments
came after nearly three years of unprecedented inter-
national cooperation to combat the largest Ebola out-
break in history, one that has claimed the lives of over
11,000 people and wrought social and economic devas-
tation to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, the three
countries most heavily impacted. Re-emergence of EVD
through detection of new case clusters after countries
had been declared “Ebola Free” by WHO have also per-
sonified the enduring risks and resilience of the disease
[2, 3]. Despite these setbacks, the possibility of a wide-
spread EVD pandemic is now much farther in the dis-
tance as the outbreak transitions to its post-endemic
phase. International efforts to finally put an end to this
devastating chapter of Ebola instead focus on ongoing
concerns of treating survivors and averting any potential
further transmission, while exercising vigilance in sur-
veillance, prevention, and maintaining response capacity.
Importantly, the EVD outbreak also marks a sentinel
event in global public health, one that arguably requires
a “shift” in how we approach governance for global
health. Yet, the full repercussions of the outbreak on the
future of historic international health institutions, such
as the WHO, are only now starting to take shape.
Hence, this piece provides a summary of the current
international debate and discourse on global health gov-
ernance reform measures post-EVD, focusing on the
WHO and the future role of the United Nations in the
broader global health architecture. This is accomplished
by examining a series of reports issued by four high-
level commissions/panels convened to specifically assess
WHO’s performance and broader governance reform
post-EVD. This includes recommendations from the
WHO Interim Assessment panel established by the
WHO Executive Board (Interim Panel); an external inde-
pendent panel jointly convened by the Harvard Global
Health Institute-London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine (“Harvard-LSHTM panel” comprised of mem-
bers from academia, think tanks and civil society); the
Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the
Future (CGHRF) convened by the U.S. National Acad-
emy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine);
and a separate High-Level Panel on the Global Response
to Health Crises appointed by UN-Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon (Kikwete Panel). It then discusses recent
actions taken by WHO in response to calls for reform
and also provides a critical assessment of how global
health governance needs to “evolve” in order to
modernize for the 21st century.
Discussion
Is the “Evolution” of Global Health Governance
Underway?
Influenza viruses evolve in two different ways including
antigenic “drift” (e.g. small genetic mutations occurring
continuously over time) and “shift” (e.g. major, abrupt
changes/reassortment leading to different virus subtypes
with high virulence and pandemic potential) [4]. This
evolutionary process presents significant challenges in
developing therapeutics and vaccines, as well as respond-
ing with appropriate public health measures, as viruses
adapt to their environment and traverse multiple animal
and human hosts. Similar to the “drift” that occurs in viral
evolution, previous disease outbreaks of SARS (2002),
H1N1/A (2009), MERS-CoV (2013), and the ever-looming
threat of highly pathogenic influenza (e.g. H5N1), precipi-
tated the current crisis in global health governance now
occurring post-EVD [5–8]. Criticism has been swift, in-
cluding strong statements from several heads of state, key
civil society actors, national governments, and academia,
opining on the need to pursue more radical reform mea-
sures, primarily focused on the future of WHO [9–13].
These developments could mark the beginnings of a
“shift” in the evolution of global health governance.
Pre-Ebola reform
Calls to reform WHO are not new, but have grown in-
cessantly louder in the wake of EVD [13, 14]. As the
international public health agency charged with “the at-
tainment by all people of the highest possible level of
health”, WHO has faced many hurdles over the past two
decades [15, 16]. Many of WHO’s challenges can be at-
tributed to persistent budget limitations that have led to
cuts in funding/staff and reallocation of resources from
normative functions to discretionary programs highly
influenced by donors [5, 6, 17]. Additional challenges
arise from changing programmatic and Member State
priorities, the formation of new global health initiatives
(e.g. UNAIDS, GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, PEPFAR,
Stop TB Partnerships, and The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) that often maintain
parallel health systems and bypass traditional inter-
national governance structures, the rise of alternative
channels/mechanisms of funding, and political inaction
by Member States to pursue needed reforms identified
as early as the 1990s [5, 6, 14–16, 18].
Previous international public health emergencies have
also foreshadowed governance challenges that WHO
would be forced to confront during the EVD outbreak.
Specifically, the 2002 SARS outbreak, a novel corona-
virus that spread to more than two dozen countries,
marked a paradigm shift ushering in a new era of the
globalized pathogen and demanded a modernization of
WHO governance instruments and outbreak response
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processes [19, 20]. Though generally viewed as well man-
aged due to an unprecedented international response co-
ordinated by WHO and its Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN), the SARS outbreak never-
theless exposed certain weaknesses [21]. Challenges in-
cluded countries failing to report the threat of a potential
outbreak with international implications, lack of sufficient
“global” surveillance capacity, conflict between economic
and trade considerations in public health emergencies,
and global politics hindering WHO assistance [19, 21–24].
Most importantly, SARS also made it clear that the
WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR) were in
need of an urgent update, leading to its revision in 2005,
which required Member States to commit to minimum
core public health systems, including surveillance, la-
boratory capacity, and emergency response capabilities
[19, 25, 26]. The revision also granted WHO expanded
authority by requiring Member States to proactively re-
port potential international disease events and giving
WHO the power to declare a “public health emergency
of international concern” (PHEIC.) It also charged the
agency with the difficult duty of balancing competing in-
terests of trade, travel, human rights, and public health
measures [19]. Fast forward to August 2014, when
WHO issued its third-ever PHEIC for the EVD out-
break, and many of these challenges would “re-emerge”
despite efforts to address them in the 2005 IHR revision.
Though a revision to the IHR was an important step
post-SARS, more fundamental reform measures to ad-
dress limitations associated with WHO’s governance and
organizational structure have not been carried out as
successfully. Proposals on how to pursue WHO reform
post-SARS and pre-EVD have differed widely in scope
and strategy. This includes reform proposals that have
been structural, such as forming a new “Committee C”
to engage a broader set of stakeholders (including civil
society organizations); creating a “World Health Forum”
for non-state actor engagement (a proposal rejected by
Member States and criticized by civil society actors); split-
ting WHO into two separate technical and political entities;
revising WHO’s constitution; and reforming WHO’s
decentralized regional structure [6, 27–30]. Other re-
forms have focused on operational and financial aspects of
WHO including: ensuring more sustainable operational fi-
nancing by abolishing the zero-nominal growth require-
ment for member state contributions; allowing WHO to
practice currency hedging, and establishing an ‘emergency
fund’ [10, 31–33]. Still others have argued for additional
powers/authority for WHO including: empowering
WHO with additional normative "soft" and "hard" law
instruments (e.g. 'Framework Convention on Global
Health';) and complete "reinvention" of WHO's
mandate, powers, and structures (see summary in
Table 1) [10, 15, 34].
Though the WHO reform process has been ongoing
for decades crossing the tenure of several past WHO
Director Generals, the formal reform process carried out
by WHO immediately proceeding the EVD outbreak was
limited in scope, primarily focused on incremental in-
ternal governance changes [14]. These included: reasses-
sing future financing of WHO, setting the organization’s
priorities in health, cutting its budget, drafting a
framework for engagement with non-state actors, and
implementation of other internal governance, program-
matic, evaluation, accountability, and managerial reform
measures [14, 35].
Post-Ebola reform
Post-EVD, WHO’s future is now at a critical juncture, as
widespread criticism of WHO’s handling of the EVD
outbreak has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the
specialized agency’s ability to lead, coordinate, and
mobilize an effective international response to the threat
of a pandemic. With the stakes never higher, the urgency
for WHO reform has been accelerated and is influenced
by a collection of recommendations from four high-level
Table 1 Select WHO reform recommendations in the literature pre-EVD
Governance proposal Description Citation(s)
Committee C Establishment of a new “Committee C” of WHA to
debate major health initiatives and engage and
coordinate across a broader array of global health
stakeholders (including non-state actors.)
Silberschmidt G, Matheson D, Kickbusch I. Creating a committee C
of the World Health Assembly. Lancet. 2008 May 3;
371(9623):1483–6. [27]
World Health Forum Establishment of a new informal multistakeholder
forum to engage non-state actors. This proposal
was subsequently rejected by member states and
also criticized by civil society actors
Commentary: Hawkes N. Re: “Irrelevant” WHO outpaced by younger
rivals. BMJ 2015; 343(aug09 1):d5012–2. WHO website: http://
www.who.int/dg/reform/en_who_reform_world_health_forum.pdf [28]
Splitting WHO Dividing WHO secretariat functions into two
different technical and political stewardship
entities, with collaboration in areas that overlap.
Hoffman SJ, Rottingen J-A. Split WHO in two: strengthening political
decision-making and securing independent scientific advice. Public
Health 2014; 128(2):188–94. [6]
Revising WHO’s
Constitution
Revising WHO’s constitution to fill the gaps in
global governance as part of WHO reform process
and for broader democratization of the agency.
Hoffman SJ, Rottingen J-A. Dark Sides of the Proposed Framework
Convention on Global Health’s Many Virtues: A Systematic Review
and Critical Analysis”. Health & Human Rights Journal 15(1): 117–134. [29]
Mackey BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:699 Page 3 of 12
panels/commissions that examined WHO’s performance
during the EVD outbreak [13, 36, 37]. These include rec-
ommendations from the Interim Panel, the Harvard-
LSHTM panel, the CGHRF, and the Kikwete Panel,
which were reviewed and compared for: (1) proposals
specifically addressing internal governance reforms or
new mechanisms within WHO’s structure (not including
reform proposals specific to the functioning of IHR,
which deserve separate in-depth discussion); and (2)
proposals focused on involvement and/or coordination
from the United Nations on global health and health
emergency activities (see summary of characteristics of
Panels in Table 2).
The first group to issue its recommendations was the
WHO Interim panel comprised of independent experts
appointed by WHO, who at the May 2015 68th World
Health Assembly (WHA) delivered a report stating that
the agency lacked the “capacity or organizational cul-
ture” to respond to emergency public health events [38].
The Interim Panel also concluded that WHO managed
the crisis by prioritizing “good diplomacy” over neces-
sary action, but offered no alternative to WHO, arguing
instead that the agency should continue in its central
role as the world’s lead health emergency response
agency [38]. The panel recommended a set of reforms
largely aimed at re-establishing WHO’s central role in
health emergencies by advocating for: (a) strengthening
of the IHR; (b) establishing a contingency fund for out-
break response; (c) formation of an independent Centre
for Emergency Preparedness and Response (housed
within WHO but overseen independently); (d) support
for a WHO plan to develop a global health emergency
workforce; and (e) WHO playing a more central role in
R&D efforts for future health emergencies [38]. It also
recommended the UN Secretary-General consider the
appointment of a Special Representative or Special
Envoy aimed at garnering greater political and financial
support during a global health crisis, but did not recom-
mend establishment of a permanent UN structure/mis-
sion. Importantly, many of these core proposals would
set the framework for similar proposals expanded upon
and carried forward by the other panels.
In November 2015, the Harvard-LSHTM panel pub-
lished a set of 10 recommendations in the Lancet, which
included several governance reform measures far more
expansive than the first set of recommendations made
by the Interim Panel. Reforms cover broader areas of
global health governance and also include specific re-
form measures for WHO, all of which are grouped into
four thematic areas of preventing, responding, conduct-
ing research, and governing the broader global system
for disease outbreaks [39]. Reforms specific to WHO in-
cluded: (a) creating a WHO dedicated independent
centre for outbreak response; (b) formation of a politic-
ally insulated WHO Standing Emergency Committee for
PHEIC declaration; (c) investing and strengthening glo-
bal capacity to rapidly respond to outbreaks; (d) carrying
out time-bound reforms to refocus and streamline
WHO; (e) having WHO convene global stakeholders to
develop a framework of norms and rules and a global fi-
nancing facility for R&D relevant to disease outbreaks;
and (f ) instituting internal good governance reforms in
exchange for more sustainable funding [39]. Broadly
speaking the Harvard-LSHTM panel calls for more ac-
tive engagement by WHO with the greater global com-
munity in managing infectious disease outbreaks, while
also recommending that the agency scale back oper-
ational activities and instead focus on certain core func-
tions [39]. Importantly, the panel also took the step of
recommending the establishment of two structures by
Table 2 Characteristics of EVD High-level panels and commissions
Panel/commission name Entity Number of members/
recommendations
WHO Interim Assessment Panel Established by WHO Executive Board comprised of mix of independent experts -Date issued: May 2015
−5 members
−21 recommendations
Harvard-LSHTM Panel Establishment by Harvard Global Health Institute and London School of Hygiene
& Tropical Medicine primarily from academia, foundations, think tanks, and NGOs
-Date issued: November 2015
−22 members
−10 recommendations
CGHR Established as an independent commission with National Academy of Medicine
as secretariat funded by foundations and agencies. Commission comprised of
members from different countries, foundations, and entities.
-Date issued: January 2016
−17 members
−26 recommendations
Kikwete Panel Established by UN Secretary General comprised of political representatives of
member states
-Date issued: January 2016
−6 members
−27 recommendations
WHO Advisory Group on Reform
of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and
Emergencies
Established by the WHO Director General to offer guidance on the organization’s
emergency reform process. Group chaired by UN SG Special Envoy on Ebola and
various members from UN agencies, NGOs, representatives of government health
agencies, and others.
-Date issued: January 2016
−19 members
−9 core recommendations in
its second report
Note: Julio Frenk served on both the WHO Interim Panel and the CGHR. Lawrence Gostin and Gabriel Leung served on both the Harvard-LSHTM panel and CGHR
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the UN Security Council: an Accountability Commission
and a Global Health Committee that would independ-
ently assess outbreak response and elevate political
attention to international health threats [39].
A few months later in January 2016, the CGHRF is-
sued its own comprehensive report with an even more
expansive list of 26 recommendations aimed at serving
as a broader framework to address the “neglected” threat
of infectious-disease crises. Recommendations were cat-
egorized under four domains of investment, building
public health capabilities, strengthening surveillance,
and accelerating R&D for pandemics [40]. Ten of these
recommendations are specific to WHO, with some mir-
roring previous recommendations by the Interim and
Harvard-LSHTM panels (e.g. formation of an independent
Center funded by increased member state contributions,
establishment of a contingency fund, and strengthening of
the IHR.) [41]. The CGHRF generally advocated for
strengthening WHO’s capacity to lead in pandemic pre-
paredness and response by further reinforcing previous
recommendation to create a WHO Center for Health
Emergency Preparedness and Response, though independ-
ently overseen by a Technical Governing Board [41]. It
also called for the involvement of the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help finance and
strengthen implementation of IHR core capacities. Add-
itionally, the CGHRF called for WHO to actively engage
in other proposed governance structures that would
oversee acceleration of R&D for pandemic preparedness
and response (including the establishment of an inde-
pendent Pandemic Product Development Committee)
[41]. Finally, though the CGHRF report advocates for
enhanced cooperation between WHO and regional,
sub-regional, national governments, and non-state ac-
tors, it does not directly call for a UN leadership role,
other than in the context of developing strategies for
sustaining health systems capacity in fragile/failed
states and during times of war.
Shortly thereafter, at the end of January 2016, the
Kikwete Panel finalized its own report titled “Protecting
Humanity from Future Health Crises”, recommending a
final set of 27 measures to avert a future global pan-
demic, specifically noting that the risk of a highly patho-
genic influenza virus was a chief concern [42].
Recommendations from the panel carry on similar
themes to prior panel recommendations and are
grouped into national, regional/sub-regional, and
international-level recommendations, as well as sub-
themes of development and health, R&D, financing, and
follow-up and implementation recommendations. Chief
among them included forming a Centre for Emergency
Preparedness and Response within WHO, advancing full
implementation of the IHR, securing appropriate finan-
cing for the WHO Centre and IHR compliance, and
having WHO oversee the establishment of a fund and
priority list to support R&D for neglected communicable
diseases [42]. In addition, the panel strongly emphasized
the need for a clear line of command within the UN sys-
tem to coordinate a global response to a health and hu-
manitarian emergency and more bodly recommended
the establishment of a High-level Council on Global
Public Health Crises housed within the UN General As-
sembly [42]. Similar to the Interim Panel and CGHRF,
the Kikwete Panel offered its strong endorsement of WHO
as the “single” global health leader, but also noted that
should the WHO fail to successfully reform or be empow-
ered by its member states, that an “alternate” UN institu-
tional response mechanism(s) might be necessary [42].
Collectively, these review panels, all governed by dif-
ferent stakeholders with varying operational mandates
and perspectives, add increasing complexity to the ur-
gent need for WHO reform post-EVD that the agency
must now navigate (see Table 3 for a summary of reform
recommendations summarized into themes of WHO re-
form and UN participation.) One proposal that had
unanimous support was the formation of a WHO Centre
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, which would
be independently funded and governed but still housed
within WHO [36, 37]. Other reform measures that
garnered cross-panel support included the urgent need
to increase WHO’s assessed contributions, developing
mechanisms to enhance cooperation with non-state ac-
tors, strengthening global disease surveillance and IHR
core capacities (including creating incentives/disincen-
tives for IHR compliance,) and establishing better oper-
ational and policy coordination between WHO, UN
agencies, and other global health partners [36, 37].
In response, to the myriad of recommendations set
forth, the WHO, its Executive Board and its decision-
making body, the WHA, were tasked with how to
prioritize reforms, assess the feasibility and resources
necessary to carry them out, and determining what re-
forms would be agreeable to all of its member states.
Complicating this calculus is the fact that WHO’s
current governance structure only allows formal par-
ticipation by state actors, though the influence of
powerful non-state actors (including those who provide
the majority of funding to WHO through voluntary
contributions) is unlikely to be completely silenced.
The emergence of the Zika virus, which was declared a
PHEIC event (subsequently removed November 2016),
also has the potential to delay and/or significantly alter
the pathway of post-EVD WHO reform. The emergence
of Zika once again demonstrates that changes needed
to ensure WHO can lead in averting the next health
crisis are not currently in place [43]. Further, current
WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan’s tenure is
coming to an end, meaning any long-term reforms will
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likely need to wait until her replacement is elected in
2017 [33, 37, 44].
Conclusions
The 2014 EVD outbreak represents the re-emergence of
an old and powerful infectious disease foe that has
brought with it new urgency to address unresolved chal-
lenges in global health governance. At stake is the very
nature and identity of WHO, which is feeling pressure
to rediscover its role and relevance in a crowded and com-
plex global health landscape populated by powerful nation
states, large-scale bilateral health initiatives,
Table 3 Matrix of WHO governance reform recommendations post-EVD
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multistakeholder partnerships, development banks, influ-
ential private foundations, and other UN agencies [14, 31,
45, 46]. How WHO will navigate the complexities of re-
form recommendations remains uncertain. What is clear
is that the WHO needs to modernize in order to adapt to
a new century of shared global health security, given on-
going threats from the emergence and re-emergence of in-
fectious diseases, such as EVD and the Zika virus, and the
inevitability of future outbreaks with pandemic potential.
Prologue: reform responses by WHO
Despite the need for a revitalized WHO, reforms sup-
ported by WHO’s own high-level Advisory Group on
Reform of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies
(WHO Advisory Group, established by the WHO DG in
July 2015), whose role was to provide guidance in rela-
tion to WHO’s emergency reform process (including the
recommendations issued by the various panels), did not
recommend some of the major changes advocated by
the panels [47]. Instead, at the January 2016 WHO Ex-
ecutive Board meeting (coinciding with WHO declaring
that EVD was no longer a PHEIC) , the WHO Advisory
Group recommended critical enhancements focused on
WHO internal outbreak and health emergency manage-
ment, but did not recommend larger structural govern-
ance changes. Specifically, the group recommended the
widely supported establishment of a centrally-managed,
separate, dedicated WHO global Programme for Out-
breaks and Emergencies headed by an Executive Dir-
ector having its own budget and workforce that reports
to the WHO DG [36, 47]. WHO would leverage the for-
mation of this internal mechanism to also engage in
other reform measures including ensuring greater health
stakeholder collaboration, establishing better oper-
ational/ business processes during outbreaks, calling for
an increase in member state assessed contributions for
emergencies, capitalizing a contingency fund for emer-
gency response, and improving resource mobilization,
political engagement, accountability and external over-
sight [36, 47].
Following up on the WHO Advisory Group’s recom-
mendations, at the 69th WHA in May 2016, Member
States approved a plan formally establishing the WHO
Health Emergencies Programme with a structure in
many ways identical to that proposed by the WHO Ad-
visory Group [48]. Accompanying its formation was an
increase of $160 million to the existing WHO
programme budget for WHO’s work in health emergen-
cies, establishment by the DG of an independent over-
sight and advisory body, and the announcement of the
appointment of Dr. Peter Salama (formerly with
UNICEF) as the inaugural Executive Director [49].
Other reform recommendations that the WHO leader-
ship has committed to carrying out or that are in the
process of being implemented include the creation of a
global health emergency workforce, strengthening im-
plementation and monitoring of IHR core capacities,
funding of the $100 million contingency fund for emer-
gencies (via voluntary contributions including US$26.60
million received as of May 2016), and the development
of an “R&D Blueprint” for accelerating R&D for health
emergencies [49, 50].
Specific to the need for greater coordination and accel-
eration of R&D for vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, delivery
systems, and other health technologies to avert a future
epidemic when no existing medical countermeasures
exists, the WHO published its “Plan of Action” for its
R&D Blueprint on May 2016 [51]. This document
presents the preliminary strategy for the WHO R&D
Blueprint, as originally requested at the 68th WHA, and
envisions a central convening and coordinating role for
WHO in health R&D, a concept supported in different
forms by all of the panels [51]. Though the Plan of Ac-
tion envisions an inclusive and collaborative global ap-
proach to tackle the lack of R&D preparedness and
access to treatment made evident during the EVD out-
break, it is unclear how this framework will be funded,
implemented, and whether it will be aligned with exist-
ing governance structures and other related proposals.
This includes existing structures such as the UN High-
Panel on Access to Medicines and other financing and
normative instruments currently being explored (includ-
ing the WHO TDR Health Product Research & Develop-
ment Fund and a proposed Global biomedical R&D
treaty) [52].
More importantly, though the creation of WHO’s new
Health Emergencies Programme represents a critical in-
ternal governance “drift”, structural reforms that would
represent the needed governance “shift” to modernize
WHO continue to lack the necessary political will and fi-
nancial support for what would likely be a much more
expensive reform process [14]. For example, restructur-
ing of WHO’s current HQ/regional office/country office
organizational structure has not been seriously consid-
ered, with the focus instead on bolstering staffing and
support for WHO country offices and relying on the
newly formed Health Emergencies Programme to en-
hance coordination [14, 38, 53]. The importance of re-
structuring WHO-led coordination (between WHO HQ,
regional and country offices, and other support chan-
nels) was made evident by the lack of sufficient commu-
nication and coordination between WHO HQ and its
largely autonomous regional office AFRO, a factor iden-
tified as contributing to the spread of EVD [13, 53].
Additionally, a needed increase and stabilization of
WHO’s core budget (an 8% increase in voluntary contri-
butions was approved at the 68th WHA but a 5% in-
crease in member state assessments for the core budget
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was not; and a recent October 2016 WHO financing dia-
logue including a proposal by DG Chan to raise assessed
contributions 10% received mixed reactions/support) has
not been carried out, despite universal recommendation
from all the panels on the need for more sustainable fi-
nancing. Further, though the US$160 million increase in
WHO’s budget to fund the Health Emergencies Pro-
gamme (which remains only 56% funded as of Oct 2016)
is a needed investment, it falls far behind the CGHRF
recommended annual investment of $4.5 billion to
strengthen global infectious disease capacity []. Finally,
though the WHO adopted a Framework for Engagement
with Non-State Actors (FENSA) at the 69th WHA follow-
ing 2 years of intergovernmental negotiations, the struc-
ture of the framework is limited to operational procedures
and engagement management, and has also been criti-
cized by certain stakeholders [14, 54, 55]. As such, it
will likely fall short in establishing robust partnerships
and creating a much needed space for formal interac-
tions between WHO and critical non-state actors
clearly needed during health emergencies.
Greater Leadership by the UN in Global Health?
Growing recognition of the importance of global health
and the unremitting threat of an emerging infectious
disease outbreak may make it untenable to simply wait
and hope for a sufficiently reformed WHO. Instead, the
lasting legacy of the EVD outbreak may be its foresha-
dowing of a governance “shift” in formal sharing of the
complex responsibilities of global public health and
health security to other international structures, most
notably various organs of the United Nations [36]. In
September 2014, the UN authorized the first-ever UN
emergency health mission, the UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response (UNMEER), and thus became the
central actor charged with mobilizing and coordinating
resources across UN agencies, multiple states, and other
partners working to stop EVD. UNMEER was estab-
lished as a temporary measure to provide immediate
financial, human resource, and logistic support for af-
fected countries with the primary objectives of stopping
the outbreak, treating the infected, ensuring access to es-
sential services, creating stability, and preventing further
escalation [56]. However, UNMEER’s participation has
not been without criticism. In fact, reports by panels/
commissions have noted that while UNMEER brought
high-level political and financial support, coordination of
the crisis became more difficult during its tenure in
affected countries [38, 39]. Nevertheless, UNMEER’s cre-
ation brings a new dimension to global health govern-
ance as it is the first apparatus constructed to provide a
singular UN system-wide approach in order to establish
unity in combating a public health emergency. In
addition to UNMEER, David Nabarro (who acted as
Chair of the WHO Advisory Group and who is also a
current candidate for the new WHO DG) was appointed
as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Ebola in
August 2014, for the purpose of providing strategic and
policy direction to improve the international response to
EVD.
UNMEER’s creation, though not viewed as entirely
successful, may serve as a precursor for what future glo-
bal health governance structures could look like in the
absence of an adequately strengthened and empowered
WHO. Hints of this potential governance “shift” mani-
fested in different panel recommendations, with all
panels calling for some form of increased involvement
by the larger UN system. Specifically, the Interim Panel
called for the appointment of a Special Representative of
the Secretary-General or a UN Special Envoy for high-
level global health threats, but stopped short of recom-
mending the establishment of a full UN mission [57].
The Harvard-LSHTM report concluded that an inde-
pendent UN Accountability Commission was needed to
assess worldwide responses to outbreaks and also rec-
ommended the creation of a Global Health Committee
as part of the UN Security Council [39]. The CGHRF
called for better communication and collaboration
mechanisms between WHO and the UN (including an
escalation process to transfer control of emergencies
from WHO to the UN Secretary-General,) and also
specified that the UN Secretary-General should lead in
developing strategies for sustaining health system capaci-
ties in fragile/failed states, though it did not support the
creation of a new UN entity [41]. The UN’s own Kikwete
Panel specifically recommended the creation of a High-
level Council on Global Public Health Crises housed
within the General Assembly made up of 45–50 political
representatives of member states in order to ensure
political accountability and reform implementation [42].
Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel’s keynote speech
at 68th WHA was even more direct, stating that WHO
cannot tackle Ebola or global health on its own, and that
its cooperation with the broader UN system and World
Bank is a critical component of any reform moving for-
ward [58, 59].
A UN High-Panel on Global Health: 21st Century Global
Health Governance?
Though calls for greater involvement by the UN in glo-
bal health have accelerated following the EVD outbreak,
recommendations for a permanent UN global health
structure are not new. As early as 2012, this author spe-
cifically advocated for the formation of a UN Global
Health Panel chaired by WHO, which could alternatively
be housed within the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) - a central mechanism of the UN system that
has been active in global health issues (including
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developing the UN Sustainable Development Goals) and
is the principal UN organ coordinating work across its
14 specialized agencies [45]. ECOSOC represents an op-
timal space to establish cooperation, coordination, and
policy coherence across the entire UN system, its tech-
nical agencies, and its respective stakeholder networks
on key global health challenges, including health emer-
gencies (see Fig. 1 for visualization of governance rec-
ommendations by the panels and the UN Global Health
Panel recommendation) [45].
An ECOSOC UN Global Health Panel would meet
many of the needs identified in post-EVD governance re-
form discussions, including acting as a permanent central
body to coordinate global health efforts across the entire
UN system (including alignment with the SDGs), allowing
engagement with a broader array of stakeholders and cre-
ating a "safe space" for these interactions through its part-
nership initiatives and forums, and could be designed in a
way that would afford it greater political visibility as well
as increased accountability by having it report directly
to the UN General Assembly [37, 45, 60–62]. Similarly,
the creation of a Global Health Committee contained
within the UN Security Council - as recommended by the
Harvard-LSHTM panel - could also elevate health emer-
gencies to the highest levels of political attention and raise
awareness among key decisionmakers. However, the
highly political nature of the Security Council could also
result in public health priorities being stymied by larger
and more influential political, security, and core foreign
policy dynamics, as has been the case in other health dip-
lomacy outcomes [63–65]. Further, the High-level Council
proposed by the Kikwete Panel would not implicitly in-
clude important multistakeholder representation from
international public health agencies, non-state actors,
NGOs, civil society, and other health actors, instead rely-
ing upon the exclusive participation of member state polit-
ical representatives.
More fundamentally, critical in assessing whether any
UN global health apparatus will work as a central pillar
in the future architecture of global health governance is
defining the appropriate roles and responsibilities of
WHO with respect to other UN institutions that are
already actively participating in global health [60]. This is
necessary in order to avoid duplication and ensure effective
Fig. 1 Visualization of Global Health Governance Reform Structures. Attached as separate file
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coordination, a challenge highlighted by the temporary and
emergency nature of the UNMEER governance interven-
tion during EVD. This would require focusing a proposed
UN global health panel’s structure on galvanizing high-level
political and financial attention to a health emergency/out-
break, while also creating a permanent policy and govern-
ance environment conducive to multistakeholder
partnership building, coordination, and mobilization of
resources that is beyond the scope of WHO’s current
operational mandates and capacity.
However, this structure would also need to leverage
the unique strengths of WHO, specifically allowing the
embattled agency to focus on its indispensable role as
the world’s chief technical health agency by imbuing it
as the Chair of the proposed structure and having the
newly established WHO Health Emergencies Programme
take a leading role when addressing issues related to
health emergencies and outbreask with panademic poten-
tial [45]. Though some may view a UN-based structure as
usurping WHO’s credibility and leading to duplication, by
positioning WHO as the chair of a UN Global Health
Panel, such a structure could serve the dual role of rees-
tablishing WHO’s relevance and strengthening its re-
sponse capabilities [66–68]. This would be accomplished
by enabling WHO with high-level political representation
and access to all the resources at the UN system’s
disposal.
Through this structure, WHO could then establish
clear and delineated roles for other actors when prepar-
ing for and responding to health emergencies. It could
then act as both the primary coordination mechanism
and provide technical support to other UN institutions,
such as the World Bank, UN Development Programme,
UNICEF, UNAIDS, UN Environmental Programme, UN
Population Fund, UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Food
and Agriculture Organization, many of whom were
active participants in the fight against EVD [45]. The de-
sign of the structure should also leverage existing inter-
agency structures already established between WHO, the
UN and other health partners (including the Global
Health Cluster and Inter-Agency Standing Committee
that both focus on humanitarian and health issues.) [13].
In this sense, a UN global health panel apparatus could
act as a hybrid multistakeholder global health body
bringing together the respective organizational and part-
nership networks available between the UN system and
WHO. This would enable more robust engagement with
key civil society actors, NGOs, foundations, civil-military
cooperation, and private sector actors that will be critical
in the prevention, detection, and response to future
health emergencies and potential pandemics.
Finally, by placing global health, health emergencies,
and infectious disease governance at the top of the UN
hierarchy, the opportunity to establish greater policy
coherence across the entire landscape of global govern-
ance mandates and instruments could be better realized
by a UN Global Health Panel. This includes ensuring
that all member states, UN agencies, and non-state part-
ners are aligned under SDG goals 3.b (supporting R&D
for infectious diseases), 3.c (ensuring a sustainable health
workforce in developing countries) and 3.d (strengthen-
ing capacity for risk reduction and management of glo-
bal health risks), all factors critical in preventing and
responding to infectious disease outbreaks. This in turn
could translate to better funding, strengthening, and im-
plementation of the IHR and the WHO R&D Blueprint,
while also supporting wider adoption of the WHO
Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment
of Health Personnel [69, 70]. Additionally, other global
health governance mechanisms can also be championed
at highest levels of political engagement, including pro-
posed instruments such as the biomedical R&D treaty and
the Framework Convention for Global Health, which
could bolster the normative powers of WHO [29, 71, 72].
This could establish a strengthened global health govern-
ance system, a step that is needed to ensure that global
health and infectious disease outbreaks are given their
rightful priority in the echelons of foreign policy and inter-
national affairs.
Summary
Only time will tell if the legacy of EVD will include a
WHO that has the full support of the international com-
munity and is capable of leading human society in this
brave new era of globalization and health. Despite current
uncertainty, the time is ripe for a radical “shift” in global
health governance by recognizing that complex global
health challenges can no longer be borne by WHO alone.
Instead, global health demands a UN systems wide ap-
proach lead by a permanent UN Global Health apparatus
combined with WHO reforms that are fair to the agency’s
current funding and capacity limitations while also lever-
aging its core strengths as the world’s preeminent inter-
national health body. The urgency for these reforms
comes at a time when global health is increasingly becom-
ing a foci for the security, economic, social, political and
health interests of all nation states, necessitating greater
shared leadership. In this sense, the impact of the EVD
outbreak is likely to go far beyond the immense human
suffering and lives lost during this tragedy, extending to
the very foundation of how we approach governance for
global health in the 21st century.
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